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MELVIN BURKE

University of Maine

Land Reform in the
Lake Titicaca Region
Bolivia's
National
Revolutionary
party (MNR) seized power in April 1952 and a year and a half later in
August 1953 promulgated the agrarian reform law, which redistributed
the land of the haciendas to the former Indian tenants and others. This
comparative economic study of the haciendas and ex-haciendas in the
Lake Titicaca region of Bolivia and Peru was undertaken to answer
three illlportant, but largely unrcsolwu, tlUcSliolls ahout lalld re-forlll : (I)
Whieh land-tenure system-large estates or small peasant farms-affords
the agriculture laborers and cultivators the greater freedom of mobility,
opportunity, income, and education? (2) Did the land-tenancy conditions
of a typical latifundio ("large landed estate") land-tenure system 1 border on serfdom and preclude freedom and was this system largely responsible for the low standard of living and education of the rural population in a traditional agrarian economy? (3) Is there any validity to the
contention that "land reform is not only a reform of the way land is held
but just as much reform of the man who tills the land?" 2

LA TIFUNDIO LAND TENURE AND LAND REFORM
Prior to the MNR revolution, Bolivia was an underdeveloped country
with a traditional agrarian sector, characterized by a latifundio system.
This chapter is un expandell vcr~i\ln (If my aniL-1.:. 'Talld Rdnrlll and Its l'Ih'ct "pon
Production lind Productivity in the lake Titicaca Regiun," published in hWI/OlI/it·
Development and Cultural Change, 18, no. 3 (April 1970), pp. 410-50.
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The agricultural sector was dearly differentiated from the nonagricultural
sector. The nonagricultural sector comprised the extractive industries and
the transport, wnstruction, and trading activities associated with, and
dependent upon, mining. Each sector had its peculiar problems. It was
tht! agrarian sector, however, which was usually singled out as being the
most backward, unproductive, and stagnant. Although approximately 70
percent of the Bolivian population was engaged in agricultural production in 1950, this sector was the source of only 30 percent of the gross
national product and less than 3 percent of the value of the exports. In
addition, roughly 40 percent of imports were food and other agricultural
good ~, most of which could have been domestically produced.3 A partial
explanation for Bolivia's backwardness can be found in an examination
of the prerevolutionary land-tenure system.
THE LATIFUNDIO LAND-TENURE SYSTEM

Before 1952 land concentration was very great. According to the 1950
agricultural census, approximately 6 percent of the largest agricultural
units constituted 92 percent of the land, while 80 percent of the smallest
held only 1 percent of the land. Three-fourths of the country's agricultural
population had no property rights. Although 30 percent of the total land
area was classified as arable, only 2 percent was cultivated. Also, there
was an inverse relationship between the size of holding and area cultivated.
While the smallest agricultural units cultivated 44 percent of their land,
the largest estates, comprising 92 percent of all land, cultivated only 1 percent of their holdings.
These statistics do little more than reveal the fact that agriculture in
Bolivia was dominated by large landed estates. The haciendas, moreover,
were not only agricultural enterprises; they were social units. This is evident in the tenancy arrangement under which the land was operated and
its product divided between the tiller and owner. The c9ionos ("Indian
tenants") were traditionally, and often quasi-legally, tied to the haciendas. For the right to use a small parcel of the estate's poorer quality land,
they were required in varying degrees to render to the landowner their
labor, tools, animals, and servitude.
THE LAND REFORM

The concentration of landed property in so few hands, the less than
progressive tenancy conditions, and the traditional methods of production
combined to render the Bolivian latifundio land-tenure system an anach-
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ronism. Many Bolivians and others came to consider this land-tenure system as one of the major obstacles to both agricultural and general
economic efficiency and progress. Among these individuals were the
leaders of the Muv;miento Naciunalista Revolucionariu who were responsible for the agrarian reform law which states that the soil, subsoil,
and waters of the nation belong to the state but guaranteed private property which fulfills a "social function." It also committed the state to an
TABLE! 1
BOLIVIAN LAND REDISTRIBUTION
1953- 1965

-- - -- -_._._Number of
Legal Redistribution
Cases

Titles Distributed

Family
Heads
Benefittd

Hectares
Distributed

32
75
281
216
313
904
1,186
1,880
1,185
626
202
6,900

3,400
4,463
11,400
9,193
18,380
38,897
45,511
50,227
47,461
18,317
15,600
262,849

2,809
3,863
8,028
5,709
12,097
22,410
28,2\0
28,843
40,641
11,295
9,652
173,557

51,8ll
46,604
276,293
201,631
316,462
825,871
1,129,442
1,255,791
1,271,686
531,946
365,042
6,272,579

Year
----_....• _--_._---_.
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
Total

Hectares
Reverted
to the State

_._ '--- -

579
103
367
4,040
26,899
38,379
24,950
91,905
33,497
23,2~~

243.960

Source: Bolivia, Departamento de Estadistica, Servicio Nacional Reforma Agraria (February
8, 1966), unpublished. Provided by the department head, Sr. Hector Mercado Negrete

"equitable" distribution of land. The land-reform decree further stipulated
that small peasant farms, cooperatives, and indigenous communities were
to be created and expanded by the redistribution of all the latifundio land
and portions of "medium properties" and "agricultural enterprises." • The
expropriation was to be accompanied by monetary compensation ill the
form of 2 percent, twenty-five-year, agrarian bonds ultimately paid for
by the new beneficiaries of this reform, the campesinos ("countrymen").
Since the passage of the Bolivian land reform, substantial progress has
been made in legally redistributing the land. A comparison of the figures
in the 1950 agricultural census with those in table 1 shows that, of the
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32,749,850 hectares surveyed in 1950, 6,272,579 or 19 percent of this
amount had been legally redistributed to individual campesinos by the
beginning of 1966. A number of expedientes ("files of documents") relating to the legal distribution of land are still being processed, but, more
important, a substantial amount of land was illegally expropriated by the
campesinos.
In the midst of the early revolutionary years, 1952-1953, the campesinos organized militant sindicatos ("labor unions"), obtained control of
the countryside, and confiscated or redistributed the lands of many
estates-some of which were not liahle for expropriation under the new
law. It is important to bear in mind that the actual Bolivian land reform
is distinct from that expressed in the legal statute. Land reform in Bolivia
destroyed the latifundio land-tenure system and created the small campesino
family-operated holdings. The Bolivian landowners were never officially
compensated by the government or the carnpesinos for their expropriated
properties. The only compensation received was in the form of . ~og~_
official payments made by the campesinos to a few fortunate landowners.
President Victor Paz Estenssoro expressed the sum and substance of the
true Bolivian land reform when he said: "We made the agrarian reform.
We took the land from the unproductive and absentee landowners, and we
have given it to the campesinos who work it." 6
THE LAKE TITICACA REGION
The Lake Titicaca region is unique, since it is probably the only area
in the world where haciendas and expropriated haciendas existed side by
side in a relatively homogeneous setting.· As such, it afforded a remarkable opportunity to conduct a comparative economic study of land
tenure, land reform, and their effect upon human resources and the
economy.
A sampling of four Peruvian haciendas and four Bolivian ex-haciendas
had been chosen for examination and comparison. From a nearly complete list of all the large landed estates in the Peruvian sector of the
region, four haciendas were selected. These were livestock and grain
enterprises that were absentee owned and representative in size, production, and productivity. From the other side of the border, four Bolivian
ex-haciendas with similar characteristics were selected for comparison.
Every attempt was made to insure comparability in such areas as distance
from the lake, elevation, water access, and climate. In short, every
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Bolivian ex-hacienda investigated was matched as closely as (Xlssible
with a comparable Peruvian hacienda." Nevertheless, because all available
data indicate that the prereform Bolivian haciendas were usually smaller
in size and supported larger populations than their Peruvian counterparts,
the four Bolivian ex-haciendas investigated possessed these different characteristics. (See table 2.) A partial explanation for the difference in estate
TABLE 2
SAMPLE OF P EIIUVIAN HA CIENDAS AND BOLIVIAN Ex-H ACIENDAS

I'Cl'lIviUII

---------

. - ---

II

---

Area in hectares
Campesino families
Family heads interviewed
Percentage interviewed

4,850
35
34
97 %

lIu~iclI"u s

III

5,719
23
23
100%

4,244
23
22
96%

IV

16,3 10
94
88
94%

Total
31,123
175
167
95 %

Bolivian Ex-Haciendas
II

III

IV

Total
---- -- - - - -

Area in hectares
Campesino families
Family heads interviewed
Percentage interviewed

5,591
287
68
24%

2,348
65
30
46%

1,518
108
48
45 %

5,221
209
21
10%

14,678
669
167
25%

------ ---

size and population density among the two sampled groups can be found
in the locations of the major consumer markcts in the two nations. The
prercform Bolivian haciendas had a greater access to n large COIlSUlller
market, the capital city of La Paz. Thus, these estates had a nearby
market for bulky, high-cost transport products, such as potatoes, ocas,
and similar foods which are both labor and land intensive in production .
On the other hand, the lack of a similarly accessible market in the Peruvian
sector has historically oriented production toward high-value, low-cost
transport products, such as wool, for international export.
Because a hacienda is dichotomized into that portion utilized by and
for the landowner and that used by the campesinos for their subsistence,
and because an ex-hacienda is separated into those farmed cooperatively
and those farmed individually by the campesinos, two different questionnaires were used in the field study. In both cases, the services of an
interpreter were necessary, since the Indians chose to answer in their
native Aymara and Quechua languages. Also, due to the large number of

306

MELVIN BURKE

campesinos encountered on the Bolivian ex-haciendas, only a random
sample was selected for interviewing.
The field research for this article was carried out in a sedentary agricultural and stock-raising area. The Lake Titicaca region is composed of
the Altiplano portions of the department of Puno, Peru, and the department of La Paz, Bolivia, as seen in figure 1. Prior to 1953, the culture,

•

EX - HACIENDAS

D HACIENDAS

APPIIOX

SCALE
I

o

FIG. 1. LAKE

TITICACA REGION

&0 MILES
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the economy, and, above all, the latifundio land-tenure system of the
Bolivian sector were nearly identical to those of the Peruvian sector. For
example, in the department of Puno, 80 percent of the smallest agricultural units owned 3.2 percent of the land while 0.2 percent of the largest
units possessed 60 percent of the land. The same inverse relationship between size of holding and the area cultivated existed here as in La Paz.
Nearly all the large estates were absentee owned, and the tenancy conditions resembled those of prereform Bolivia except for the differences
discussed below. Finally, 70 percent of the Peruvian population was engaged in stagnant and unproductive agriculture. 1 Latifundio land-tenure
systems are not dynamic, and in many ways the Peruvian haciendas
investigatl!d resemhled the prercforlll Bolivian hadendas.
The Peruvian haciendas served only as imperfect proxies, however,
since there were a number of notable differences between the Peruvian
haciendas and the prereform Bolivian haciendas. The Peruvian Resolucion Suprema no. 14 of January 17,1964, required all campesino laborers
to be paid a minimum daily wage, and Resolucion Suprema no. 18 of
May 21,1965, formally designated the department of Puno as an agrarian
reform zone." Even though these decrees were either not fully obeyed or
inoperative, they modified the Peruvian latifundio land-tenure system.
First, because some money wages were paid to campesinos, labor was no
longer a free resource. Secondly, if they exceeded the average productivity
of haciendas in the department, the agrarian reform law enabled haciendas to retain between three thousand and eight thousand hectares of
land. After the 1965 agrarian reform went into effect, the Peruvians
have invested in capital equipment and livestock, as well as paid their
laborers minimum wages. In short, these laws were instrumental in bringing about changes in the resource mix within the haciendas. Nevertheless,
if one would ignore all of the cash income of the Peruvian campesinos,
much of the newly acquired capital, and some of the international wool
sales of the Peruvian haciendas, one would approxim ate the prereform
Bolivian sector of the Lake Titicaca region.
As can be seen in table 2 on page 305 two important distinctions
between the haciendas and ex-haciendas must be borne ill mind. First,
although the same absolute number of campesino family heads was interviewed on both sides of the border, the sample of 167 Peruvian campesinos represented 95 percent of all hacienda employees, while the 167
Bolivians interviewed represented only 25 percent of the total number of
campesino family heads on the ex-haciendas. Secondly, while the same
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number of haciendas and ex-haciendas was included in the sample, the
Peruvians had twice the amount of land as the Bolivians. Finally, official
governmental statistics and studies of other Peruvian haciendas and
Bolivian ex-haciendas were used throughout this study as supplemental
sources of data and information. Studies of prereform Bolivian haciendas
were also used for the historical comparison of before and after the land
reform.

RELATIVE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF
PERUVIAN HACIENDAS AND BOLIVIAN EX-HACIENDAS
ECONOMIC RESOURCES

In an attempt to make the analysis of the cffect of the Bolivian land
reform upon human resource development more readily comprehensible,
this section will briefly summarize the economic performance of the sampled Peruvian haciendas and Bolivian ex-haciendas in the Lake Titicaca
region." Total population estimates based upon the sample averages obtained in the field study indicate that the Bolivian ex-haciendas supported four times as many people with only half as much land as the
Peruvian haciendas. Thus, the population density of the Bolivian exhaciendas was more than eight times that of the Peruvian haciendas (see
table 3).
The greater population density of the Bolivian ex-haciendas was reTABLE 3
COMPARISON OF HACIENDA AND Ex·HACIENDA POPULATIONS

Total population
Total "weighted economically
active" population'
Population density per square
mile

Peruvian
Haciendas

Bolivian
Ex· Haciendas

998.0

3,847.0

560.0

2,141.0

8.3

67.9

Note: In this table and all the following ones, except where indicated,
the figures represent projections based on the sample averages obtained
in the field sludy .
a. Computed 011 the basis of the following weights furnished by the
Olicina Nacional de Evaluacion de Recursos Naturales de Puno, Peru:
male over seventeen years of age = 1.0; female over seventeen years of
age = 0.8; male and female ten to seventeen years of age = 0.5; and all
others = 0.0.
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flected in the I!I.oIe...i.QJ~lI.sive utilization of the land. as seen in table 4. In
the aggregate the Bolivian ex-haciendas cultivated six times as many hectares as the Peruvian haciendas during the agricultural year 1964- 1965.
Approximately 5 percen t of the Bolivian ex-hacienda land was cultivated
as compared to less than 0.5 percent of the Peruvian hacienda land. l o
On the Peruvian estates the lower popula tion density and greatcr land
extension were reflected in the greater specialization in sheep ranching, as
seen in table 5. By far the most numerous and important type of capital
found on both the hacienda and ex-hacienda was livestock.
Reducing all grazing li vestock to the common denominator of a sheep
("unida animal ovino" Dr V.A.O.) enabled the computation of some interesting livestock statis tics (table 6). When the livestock is weighted
accordingly, data show that the Peruvian haciendas had twice as much
livestock as the Bolivian ex-haciendas. Taking population and land into
consideration, the livestock density per hectare was nearly equal for both
sampled groups, although the Peruvian campesinos shepherded approximately eight times as many animals as their Bolivian counterparts.
Land, labor, and livestock capital were the most important economic
resources on these trad itiqnal units of production. Of lesser influence
production and productivity were physical capital a~d management.
It is difficult to say whether haciendas or ex-haciendas possessed the
greater quantity of phys ical capital, since it was virtually impossible to
weigh the greater quantity of hand tools and new constructions of the
campesinos on the Bolivian ex-haciendas against the old physical plant
and more modern machi nery and equipment on the Peruvian haciendas.
In addition, the institutional nature of these traditional agrarian units
of production suggests that possession of economic resources did not imply their rational or com pie te utilization in production. For example, although the Peruvian hacicndas employed professional managers. owned
large tracts of land, and used agricultural equipment such as tractors, the
influence of all these upon production was less than one would expect. The
Peruvian haciendas were not only absentee owned, but to a degree,
absentee managed. This partially explains the observed underutilization
of agricultural machinery on the estates." Large extensions of land were
also lying idle or underu tilized on these estates, since the Peruvian landowners only put about half their total land in production. On the other
hand, because a smaller quantity of labor was combined with greater
amounts of other resou rces such as land and livestock , the Peruvian
campesino's labor and time were fully utilized on the haciendas .

upon

TABLE 4
UTILIZATION OF LAND

(1/1 H ectares)

Cultivated by and for
Type of Land

Campesinos Hacendados

Pasture and/ or Land in Res! of
Campesinos

Hacendados

Joint Use

Total Land Area

4.328.5
10.219.5
14,548.0

20. 189.0
10.934.0
31,123.0

2,929.0
5,523.0

6,644.0
8,034.0
14,678 .0

Peruvian Haciendas

Level
Hill and/ or broken

Total

5.5
18.5

53.0
41.0

220.0
655.0

15,582.0

24.0

94.0

875.0

15,582.0

342.0
378.0
720.0

10.0
2.0
12.0

2,678.0
602.0

685.0
1,529 .0
2,214 .0

Bolivian Ex-Haciendas

Level
Hill and/ or broken
Total

3,280.0

8.452.0
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TABLE 5
DISIRIDUTION OF

TorAL LIVESTOCK

P...:ru

Sheep
Cattle
H orses
Borras'
Alpaca
Llama
Fowl
Pigs

Bolivia

Campcsilws

H~cclltla<.1us

Total

Campcsino5

C()operativc ~

Total

9,592
1,334
385

52,955

62,547
2 ,846
500

18,156

845

19,001

2,348

42

2,39U

236
843
321

381

16
381

1,455
1,508
1,704

1,455
1,508
1,778

229

607
321
253
61

1,512
1\5
7
236
41
7

295

68

16

38

Nvre: Nearly allthc sheep and cattle of the Bolivian and Peru vian campcsilll>s wcr" (If the
dcgencrate criollo ("Joll1csti C") type, while those of the Peruvian hacclldad os w<.,rc predominantly crossbreeds bctw-een criollos and imported (improwu) sLOck .
II . Mille Illmbs not yet tW(~ yellrs old.

Oil the Bolivian ex-haciendas the situation was reversed; it was I.a!;)or
which was not completely expended on production, and land which was
more fully exploited. aecause the Bolivian campesino was not required
t.(), render his labor services to any landowner, and because his small holdings and animal herds <lid not require all his time, he possessed greater
leisure and time for wo rk outside the ex-hacienda. Comparing them with
. the Peruvian haciendas, more labor and an equal amount of livestock
were combined with each hectare of land on the Bolivian ex-haciendas.
Thus, land was more fully utilized on the Bolivian ex-haciendas.

TABLE 6
COMPARISON OF HACIENDA AND Ex-HACIENDA LIVESTOCK

Pcruvillll
Hu.;i..:llllus
Tota l livestock (U .A.O.'s)
Livestock (U.A.O.',..) per hectare
Livestock (U.A.O.'s) per campesino
family

89,139
2.9
512

II1lliviUIl
Ex -' luc.:iclldu s
44,408
3.0

66

Note: There are var iOll S rncthoJs used 10 compule this sheep t:,\uivalt:nt
unit (lI.A.O .) whicl-:. is the reducti on of all grazing animals to the lanu
capacily for an adu It sheep. The ooe used here is that of the Agrarian
Reform Office of PU.llO, Peru: sheep = I, cultlc = 6, horses and burros
= 8, alpacas and Il<a.mas = 3, and pigs = 2.
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TOTAL-VALUE PRODUCTION AND PRODUCTIVITY

The different amounts of economic resources available to the haciendas and ex-haciendas and the diverse utilization of the same manifest
themselves most obviously in production and productivity. The Peruvian
haciendas raised approximately $170,000 worth of agricultural produce
during the 1964-1965 year, which is only slightly larger than the estimated $149,000 produced by the Bolivian ex-haciendas.'2 Four times as
many Bolivian campesinos were engaged in producing nearly the same
output on only half as much land; in other words the Bolivian ex-haciendas were, on the average, twice as productive with respect to land and
one-fourth as productive with respect to labor as the Peruvian haciendas.
Productivity statistics and estimates of the average monetary return to
each available economic resource are set forth in table 7.
TABLE 7
VALUE PRODUCTIVITY

(/1/ Oollar,l)
----------------------------------

Statistics

Peruvian
Haciendas

Bolivian
Ex-Haciendas

.----~-~---.---

Value output

-Hectare-Value output
Man-years of labor-;

5.47

$10.15

304.00

69.62

0.38

0.40

105.31·

88.45

$

Value animal products
-iTvestockc-a-pit~

Value crops
Hectaresciliirvated

a. The man-year equivalents of labor figures are the same as the
"economically active population" ligures computed in table 3, p. 308.
b. This figure of the total value of livestock was computed by
multiplying the average prices of animals sold in tables 16 and 17 by
the total number of animals on the haciendas and ex-haciendas in
table 6 on p. 311.
c. This average-value figure inCludes only the output of the three
haciendas for which dutu afC availahle, i.e., it excludes that of
hacienda IV.

ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY WITH RESPECT TO
SIZE OF FIRM AND LABOR PRODUCTIVITY

Which were more efficient-the Peruvian haciendas or the Bolivian
ex-haciendas? Because of the limitations of the data and the lack of a
general consensus upon the criteria of efficiency, the reader should be
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forewarned not to expect a definitive nnswcr to this Cilicstion . For, although few economists condone the tenure conditions on the large haciendas, many rally to defend the haciendas in the name of economies
of scale and labor productivity. Thus, an important consideration is
whether size economies resulting from such indivisible inputs as capital
equipment and management existed on the Peruvian haciendas. It appears
that the underutilization of agricultural machinery, management, and land
on the Peruvian estates prevented the realization of any size economies.
Also, no evidence of financial economies of scale, such as quantity discounts from marketing, was uncovered. This does not imply that the
small campesino holdings on the Bolivian ex-haciendas were either efficient or of optimum size. The implication is, however, that the large
landed estates in the sample were not necessarily more efficient than the
small eampesino holdings by virtue of size alone. In brief, the findings of
this study indicate that there probably is no overwhelming advantage to
any particular size Altiplano agricultural unit of production under existing
institutional and technological conditions.
But what is the economic significance of the difference in labor productivity on the haciendas and ex-haciendas? Was the lower labor productivity of the Bolivian ex-haciendas evidence of a less efficient allocation
of resources? What is needed to analyze this allocative efficiency is information on prices of both resources and production at the margin,
which, unfortunately, was not available. Even information obtained from
production functions would have limited value, since the price of land and
labor to the Bolivian campesino were nonmonetary opportunity costs. It
appears that the Peruvian haciendas were more efficient in their use of
labor. However, when labor is abundant relative to land and capital, as it
was in both sectors of the region, the area yielding the higher output
per hectare, in this case the Bolivian ex-haciendas, can be considered
more efficient.
When technology, incentive, and employment are taken into consideration, neither the Peruvian haciendas nor the Bolivian ex-haciendas
could be considered to be more eflicient or to perform ill 1\ Sllpcrior
economic manner. The evidence suggests that both sampled groups were
producing short of their optimum.
PRODUCTION FOR THE MARKET

With more and better breeds of animals, twice as much land, and onefourth the population of the Bolivian ex-haciendas, one would expect the
Peruvian haciendas to produce more for the market. This is precisely
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what the data reveal, using the total value of products sold as crude approximation of agricultural surplus. In the agricultural year 1964-1965
the sampled Peruvian haciendas sold approximately $142,000 worth of
products on the market as compared to about $51,450 sold by the Bolivian
ex-haciendas.'J Not only did the Peruvians sell nearly three times as
much in absolute dollar value as the Bolivians, but they sold a greater
proportion of their output. The Peruvian haciendas sold 85 percent and
the Bolivian ex-haciendas 34 percent of their respective gross outputs.
The sale of wool accounts for the greater part of this difference, however. Approximately $65 ,000 of foreign exchange was earned by the
Peruvian hacendados from the sale of wool in international markets." If
one subtracts this amount from the Peruvian hacienda sales, the value of
products sold in their respective domestic markets by the haciendas and
ex-haciendas is more nearly equal. Although the four Peruvian haciendas
and the four Bolivian ex-haciendas investigated constituted only a fraction of all those in the Lake Titicaca region, they were quite similar-and
in many respects virtually identical-to most other haciendas and
ex-haciendas in the region.
THE EFFECTS OF THE BOLIVIAN LAND REFORM
To what extent does this difference in economic performance between
the Peruvian haciendas and Bolivian ex-haciendas reflect changes
brought about by the Bolivian land reform? In any attempt to answer
this question, let us begin by briefly outlining the major characteristics of
the prereform Bolivian haciendas, since the Peruvian haciendas investigated, as stated above, served only as imperfect proxies for the prereform
Bolivian haciendas.
PREREFORM BOLIVIAN HACIENDAS

The prereform Bolivian haciendas were, to a much greater degree than
the Peruvian ones, mere agglomerations of small Indian saYGllas ("usufructuary tracts of land"). In the Lake Titicaca region, approximately twothirds of the prcreform Bolivian haciendas were cultivated exclusively by
and for the Indians, who also owned approximately three-fourths of the
livestock.
The Bolivian haciendas did not possess great quantities of productive
physical capital or employ production methods other than those traditionally used by their Indian tenants. Nor did they special,ize in wool
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production for the inte mational market, and nearly all their sheep and
cattle were of the deger.cralc criollo type. Thc prcrcform Bolivian hacicllaas also supported larger populations and cultivated a greater portion of
their lands than did the .Peruvian haciendas.
CHANGES IN RESOURCE S

Since the Bolivian I.a.nd reform, the population of the ex-haciendas in
the Lake Titicaca region has ~oubled as a result of the natural increase in
populatiQu and migration to these lands from the indigenous communities,
lIilages, and cities. Perhaps this growth helps to explain why La Paz
does not have the extensive barriadas ("slums") typical of most large
Latin American cities. This population increase, in turn, has given rise to
a slightly more intensive use of the land. Although many new campesino
~ayafias were carved out of the old hacendado ("estate owner's") lands
to accommodate the larger population, ~he average sayan a has nol c.:hanged
in size or composition si nee the land reform.
However, since the I and reform, there has been a small reduction in
the total number of nalimals in the sector. This occlIm:J hecause the
landowners were able to sell some of their animals, some peri shed through
neglect, and an additie> nal number were confiscated by the campesinos.
Since that time, howe"er. the herds have been gradually built up to
nearly their prercform size. But there has been a slight deterioration ill
the quality of the shee.F and cattle, or, at least, there has been no improvement of the herds since 1953. Also, a decrease has occurred in the
average size of the can1pesino herd. These statements are supported in
table 8 by data from .he field study, the Viacha study, and the 1946
ministry of agriculture study-all major sources of information drawn
upon in this comparisoa.
Finally, since 1953 t.l1e old adobe structures of the haciendas have deteriorated, because tbe campesinos refused to replace the ir paja
("grass") roofs. This destruction, however, has been compensated for by
the construction of new- campesino homes and schools. In addition, since
the Bolivian land reform disinvestment in the form of a decrease in the
amount of agricultural machinay has taken place on the ex-haciendas.
Rarely does one see a tractor today in the Bolivian sector of the Lake
Titicaca region. It is ifTlpossible to determine how much of this mobile
machinery and equipme nt was removed by the landowners and how much
was destroyed as a res Lilt of campesino indifference and neglect. There
has been no inflow of agricultural equipment in the area either for re-
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TABLE 8
ECONOMIC R"-SOURCf.5 BEfORE AND

AnER LAND REFORM

Ikfure Land Reform'
Population density per square mile
Livestock (U.A.O.) density per hectare
U.A.O.'s owned per campesino family
Approximate average size of
campesino sayana (in hectares)
Total land area cultivated

After Lund Reform

35.0
3.3
93.0

68.0
3.0
66.0

6.0-8.0
1.0-6.0%

6.0-8.0 •
5.0%

b

a. Source: ESludio socio-ecol/omica ell las provillcias de omasuyos, ingavi, y los andes del
deparramem de La paz (La Paz, 1946).
b. Sources: Author's field study and Esludio ecollomico esladislico del Canton Viacha
(La Paz, 11J65).
c. It is obvious that the average Bolivian campesino did not possess, let alone own,
belween len and thirty-five hectares of land as prescribed by article 15 of tbe Decreto Ley
de la Reforma Agraria.

placement or for addition to stock since 1953, because the Bolivian campesinos have neither the funds n'o r the inclination to purchase this type of
capital.
('IIANGES IN ECONOMIC I'EI(J'ORMANCE

It is difficult to compare the economic performance of the prereform
Bolivian haciendas with the present-day ex-haciendas, because comparisons over time may reflect climatic or price changes above all else. Consequently, a rigorous historical comparison cannot be made. Nevertheless,
the subject wil1 be briefly commented upon because of the controversy
surrounding the issue of land redistribution and its economic consequences.
Because there were no verifiable size economies operative on the relatively productive Peruvian haciendas, there is even more reason to
suspect that no economies of scale were realized by the prereform Bolivian
haciendas. Consequently, when the lands used exclusively by the landowners and portions of their criollo livestock were parceled among the
campesinos after the land reform, it is unlikely that any size economies of
production were lost.
The evidence accumulated in this study suggests that I,abor productivity
on the Bolivian ex-haciendas has decreased, land productivity has !ncfl.:uSl.:d, and capital productivity has remained unchanged since the land
reform. This can be accounted for largely by the increased population,
greater use of the more marginal land, and the small decrease in agricultural equipment. Also, in part, the decrease in labor productivity reflects
the increase in leisure and off-the-farm employment of the Bolivian
campesinos.
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An increase in the number of people engaged in marginal agriculture
and a decrease in agricultural productivity per unit of labor are, however,
normally considered by econolllists to be prima facie evidl~nl'e or an inefficient allocation of a nation's resources. But Bolivia was not a full employment economy, and the decrease in labor productivity in the agrarian
sector must be considered in conjunction with the increased employment
in agriculture and the higher land productivity which resulted from the
land reform. In short, the increased marginal farming may well be an
efficient allocation of the nation's resources in the short run or until such
time as alternative employment is available.
For example, agricultural outpu t in the region has increased since the
Bolivian land reform. However, because of their greater numbers and
greater per capita consumption of food, the Bolivian campesinos have
retained a greater share of the region's larger output. At the same time,
the agricultural produce sold in the market has equaled prereform levels.
At least, this is what most official government statistics indicate.
Bolivian campesinos also have increased their commercial activity since
t~e expropriated landowners no longer supply the markets with food and
other agricultural proullce. This is seen in the 1l1lllllTOllS Incal r.lir., whidl
have come into existence since the land reform, as well as the increased
coming and going of the Altiplano campesinos. The Bolivian campesino,
. like his Guatemalan counterpart, is a businessman. As Sol Tax observed,
"The Indian is perhaps above all else an entrepreneur, a businessman,
always looking for a new means of turning a penny.""
However, unless teeD no logy and human and physical capital are forthcoming, the agricultural output and SLJrplus, at best, will be augmented at
a very slow pace wit:hin the existing framework of the traditional
agrarian sector. As Theodore W. Schultz and others have shown, these
apparent traditional optima can only be exceeded by the infusion into
the agrarian sector of nontraditional inputs, such as improved seed ,
equipment, livestock, aI1d modern methods of production.'· Agricultural
credit, extension services, and other forms of assistance arc needed for
this task.
CAMPESINO INCOME, CONSUMPTION, MOBILITY,
AND EDUCATION

The growing emphasis on capital investments in human beings is one encouraging trend in current discussions oTtl'ie··l'r\alhSprings of economic growth . This
emphasis is of primary importance to agricultural development. Improving
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the quality of the labor input through new knowledge and new skills offers
one rewarding opportunity for agricultural capital investment. For this reason,
a major test of the performance of land-tenure structures is to be found in
the role they play in advancing capital investment in educationY
Labor is one of the l1Iost abundant economic resources that underdeveloped nations possess. The labor force is only an asset to economic
efficiency and progress when it is healthy, educated, and mobile. Many
development economists have theoretically demonstrated the merits of:
(1) freeing the agricultural labor force so that its members may migrate to
the industrial sector when conditions warrant, (2) providing the laborers
with sufficient income to purchase manufactured products as well as to
keep body and soul together, and (3) educating and informing these individuals so that they may become more productive economic resources
and participating citizens. But h u w did the two sampled groups of campesinos in the Lake Titicaca region fare under the different land-tenure
systems? Did the haciendas of the Peruvian sector or the ex-haciendas of
the Bolivian sector afford the campesinos a greater freedom (i.e., mobility
and opportunity), income, and education?
To begin with, the sampled populations possessed many similar characteristics. For example, the average size of a' household was 5.70 on the
Peruvian estates and 5.75 on the Bolivian ex-haciendas. The average
ages of the two sampled groups were twenty-four and twenty-three
respectively. In both sampled groups roughly 55 percent of the population was under twenty years of age.
CAMPESINO INCOME

An investigation of the income patterns of the campesinos on the
sampled Peruvian haciendas and Bolivian ex-haciendas was conducted
! in the field study. One would expect for a number of reasons the Peru: vian campesino to have a higher income and standard of living than his
Bolivian counterpart. First of all, the Peruvian campesino owned, on
the average, twice as much livestock as the Bolivian campesino and had
at his disposal an equal amount of land. Secondly, the Peruvian was more
than four times as productive on the hacienda as the Bolivian was on the
lex-hacienda. Finally, the Peruvian, unlike the Bolivian campesino, re,ceived a money wage for his labor on the hacienda. Table 9 gives an estimate or Peruvian c:llllpesino wages for thl~ agricultural year 1964- 1965.
Table 10 shows the paradox in thc data obtained in the field study, indicating that it is the .8.01ivian campesino, not the Peruvian , who received
the greater income.
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Part of this apparent paradox can be explained by the ~igher prices
that Bolivian campesinos received in the market for their animals; this
higher price is also the one imputed for the animals consumed by the
campesinos.'8 However, the Bolivian campesino did, on the average, sell
and consume a greater quantity of virtually every agricultural gO(1d produced by the haciendas and ex-haciendas in the region. In any case, the
Peruvian campesinos did not greatly benefit from their relatively higher
labor productivity; nor did the Bolivian campesinos grievously suffer from
their lower productivity. There was, in short, little relationship between
labor productivity and remuneration, at least in this respect.
TABLE 9
P ERUVIAN CAMPESINO WAGES AND SALARIES

(II/ Dollars)

Haciendas

Gross wages
State taxes'
Hacienda fees
Net wages

b

$3,097
124
1,592
$1,381

II

III

IV

Total

$557
22

$4,060
162
720
$3,178

$13,674
547

$21,388
855
2,312
$IR.221

$535

$13.127

Note: These wages and salaries do not include the salaries of the administrators. See table 1 on p. 303 for the number of families in each hacienda.
a. A 4 percent social security tax.
b. Compulsory payments made to the landowners for the use of pasture
and cultivable hacienda land.

Tablc 10 gives the impression that the Peruvian campesino, on the
average, earned twice as much money income as the Bolivian. But, when
one recalls that this table only includes income earned from the production of the haciendas and ex-haciendas, the higher money income of
the Peruvian campesino may be no more than an illusion. While interviewing the Bolivian campesinos, it became apparent that they had a
source of money income unavailable to the Peruvians-namely, outsiue
employment. The obvious reason for the Peruvian campesinos' inability
to work outside the haciendas is that their labor time was fully utilized by
the landowners. Each Peruvian campesino had assigned to his care between fOllr hundred and five hundn:d hcad or liVl.'stock which his family
herded, while he devoted most of his working time to the cultivation of the
hacendado's land, the shearing of his sheep, and the maintenance of his
buildings and other physical plants. He and his family accomplished all
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this in addi tion to farming land for their exclusive benefit and caring for
their own animals.
Such was not the case on the Bolivian ex-haciendas, where the campesinos often worked part time in the Yungas and elsewhere as agricultural
laborers and in La Paz as seasonal construction workers. Unfortunately,
due to an oversight in the construction of the questionnaire, no estimate
of the money income received by all the surveyed Bolivian campesinos
for this outside employment was obtained. Only the campesinos of one
TABLE 10
EsTIMATED CAMPESINO IN COMES mOM

HA C IENDA

AND

Ex- HACIENDA

PRODllCT ION

(III Do/lars)

Peruvian
Campesinos
Moiley wages
Other money income'
Total money income
Income-in-kind b
Total income '
Money income per family
Total income per family

$18,221
7,0 19
$25,240
10,738
$35,978
$144.22
205.59

Bolivian
Campesinos
$

-

51,451
$ 51,451
97,604
$149,055
$ 77.35
222 .80

a. Earnings frum the sale of agricultuntl products. Sce table IS,
p.336.
b. Consumption of agricultural products. These figures were obtained
by subtracting the value of products sold in table IS from the value of
output in table 14.
c. These figures do not include off-the-farm income.

ex-hacienda were asked to reveal the source and amount of such wages.
Approximately one-half of these cainpesinos were employed at least
part time outside the ex-hacienda during the agricultural year 1964-1965
i and earned between six and twenty-five dollars a month for their labor. A
very rough estimate of the average amount of money income earned per
campesino would be between fifty and seventy-five dollars per year.
In short, it may very well be that the Bolivian campesino earned not
only a greater total income but also a greater money income than 'the
Peruvian campesino.
CAMPES INO CONSUMPTION

Another indieatiofl that the Bnlivian campcsillos had greater money
incomes and, therefore, total incomes was their apparent higher st'lndard
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Watches
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NUMBER OF DURABLE GOODS OWNED IIY SAMP L ED CAMPESINOS

of living reflected in a greater consumption of manufactured goods and
other purchased products. In figure 2 one sees that the 167 Bolivian campesinos interviewed owned more durable goods of all types than the same
number of Peruvian campesinos-with the notable exception of bicycles.
Figure 3 shows that the Bolivian campesinos purchased more "storebought" dry goods. They also claimed to have worn these dothes llIore
Percentage

100

75

50

25

Hats

FIG. 3.

Shirts

o

Shoes

BOLIVIAN CAMP[ SINOS

Trouse rs

•

Jackets

Sandals

PERUVIAN CAMP[SINOS

STORE-BOUGtlT DRY GOODS OWNED BY SAMPLED CAMPESINOS
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frequently than their Peruvian neighbors. Finally, figure 4 indicates that
the Bolivian campesinos purchased and consumed more "luxury" foods
and stimulants than the Peruvians.19 In addition, one out of every two
Bolivians interviewed slept on wood or iron beds, as compared with only
one out of every ten Peruvians. Finally, nearly 60 percent of the Bolivian
campesinos had constructed new homes since 1953 while the Peruvians
had huilt no new ones.
Percentage
100

75

50

25

o

Coca

Sugar

Rice

o
FIG . 4.

Coffee

BOLIVIAN CAMPE SI NOS

Alcohol

Tobacco

•

Beef

PERUVIAN CAMPrSINOS

CONSUMPTION OF l.UXURY FOODS AND STIMULANTS BY SAMPLE!> CAMPESINOS.

Percentages for coca, sugar, rice, and coffee represent daily consumption, while those
for tobacco, alcohol, and beef reflect weekly consumption.

Bolivian campesinos could have consumed greater quantities of these
goods than the Peruvian campesinos without higher money incomes if
prices were sufficiently lower in the Bolivi an sector or if they had incurred
larger consumption debts, of course. Although price data are very scarce,
unreliable, and often rendered virtually useless by inflation, it seems that
Qurable goods and clothing were less expensive in Bolivia because of the
lower import duties and the nearness of the sampled ex-haciendas to the
major distribution center of La Paz. Coffee, tobacco, and similar ~gricul
tural products are also grown in the Yungas, a region of Bolivia which
borders the Altiplano, and this proximity made it possible for the Bolivian
campesinos to obtain these products at lower prices. In short, lower
prices in the Bolivian sector probably did account for a small part of the
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higher consumption of' the Bolivian campesinos. None of this difference in
consumption can be attributed to indebtedness, however, since campesinos, in general, were not debtors due to their unwillingness and inability
to borrow. As seen in table 11, only a fraction of the Bolivian and Peruvian campesinos interviewed were in debt, and the amounts they owed
were very small. ~o
In SIIIlI, the evidc 11CC uccull1ulakd in this slIIdy illdicall"s that thl~
Bolivian campesino, on the average, had a greater total im:ollle, a
higher standard of Ii v ing, and possibly a greate r money income than his
TABLE 11
DISTRIBUTION OF INDEBTEDNESS OF CAMPESINOS INTERVIEWED

(In Dol/ars)
Peruvian Campesinos
Creditor
Hacienda administrators
Friends and neighbors
Families
Businessmen
Agricultural banks
Total

Bolivian Campesinos •

Number
in Debt

Amount
of Debt

Number
in Debt

Amount
of Debl

5
20
8
5

$ 150
480
280

25

$257

6
2

43

1

225
$1,240

1

333
---

39

105

34

24
-

$657

a. The Bolivian cam pes ino debt does not include a $ t 5,827 debt of the cooperative (If
cx-huciclIllu I whidl is owed tll the Agricultuntl Bunk for the ex-hucicmlud .. property.

Peruvian counterpart during the agricultural year 1964-1965. Indeed,
because of the lower demand placed upon his labor and time, the Bolivian campesino had gr~~ter leisure, which in itself is a form of income.
When the more than five hundred campesinos not interviewed-nearly
all of them Bolivians-are taken into consideration, the Bolivian exhaciendas, with half t:he land extension of the Peruvian haciendas, provided a comparable Iiving for four times as many campesinos. Consequently, the purchase and consumption of manufactured goods typically
used by the campesi.I::lOs were substantially greater on the Bolivian exhaciendas than on the Peruvian haciendas.
In regard to the disposition of the incomes of the Peruvian hacendados
and administrators, a very rough estimate of the economic profit of the
four haciendas would be about $80,000. In addition, the administrators
drew salaries totaling approximately $5,000. The administrators probably
spent the greater pe:lrt of their sa1arics in Puno, and this income and
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consumption of manufactured products should be added to that of the
Peruvian campesinos. On the other hand, a portion of the recent investment in the haciendas was debt financed, as evidenced by the $25,000
they owed to local banks. Apparently. most of the hacendado economic
profit was consumed or invested outside the Lake Titicaca region and
possibly outside the nation.
CAMPESINO MOBILITY

There can be little doubt that the Bolivian campesinos were more free
and mobile than their Peruvian counterparts. This enabled them to
seek outside employment, engage in political and marketing activity, and
TABLE 12
SalOOL ATTENDANCE OF lliE SAMPLED CAMPESINO POPULATIONS
Peruvians

Percentage of population that has
attended school·
(six years old
and over)
Percentage of chi 1dren attending
school (six to
seventccn YCllrs
of age)

Bolivians
Male

Female

.Combined
Average

Male

Female

Combined
Average

54%

24 %

39(/~

63 %

30%

47%

75

43

59

75

40

58

a . These figures include all persons who were attending school as well as those who had
terminated their education.

most important of all, tp _!r.dl,l~ate themselves and their children. Approximately one out of every five Bolivian campesinos questioned had at.tended some type of adult education course since 1953, as compared with
approximately one out of every fifteen Peruvian campesinos interviewed.
Of the adult populations-all those over seventeen years of age-38
percent of the Bolivians sampled had attended school as compared with
only 23 percent of the Peruvians. Finally. of the entire sampled population
over six years of age, 47 percent of the Bolivians and 39 percent of the
Peruvians had attended or were attending school. The average level of
education of those who attended or were attending school was 2.83 years
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for the Bolivians and 2.27 years for the Peruvians. Eleven percent of the
Bolivians achieved at least a primary education (six years or more) while
only 6 percent of the Peruvians did so.
However, in table 12 one notes that approximately 60 percent of both
the Bolivian and Peru vian school-age cnildrcn (six to seventeen years of
age) were enrolled in an educational institution. Every Bolivian ex.hacienaa sampled had at least one school-nearly all newly constructed
~while two of the four Peruvian haciendas investigated had no school.
Also, the teachers of tlle Bolivian ex-hacienda schools were Indians , while
the Peruvian teachers were blancos ("whites") . In both sectors, females
were discriminated against with respect to education. Since the land reform, however, this b. as been ame1iorated in the Bolivian sector of the
region. Although the evidence is not overwhclming or conclusive, the data
TABLE 13
ILLITERACY OVER SEVENTEEN YEARS OLD

llo1ivian Campesinos

Unable to speak
Spanish
Unable to read and
write Spanish
Unable to read,
write, and speak
Spanish

Peruvian Campesinos

Male

Female

Combined
Average

400/0

77%

59');;

53 %

88%

71%

43

78

61

55

92

74

39

77

5!1

50

87

- --.- -- -- - -----..

Male

Female

Combined
Average

---.----- --

6~

--"-"- --- --- -

accumulated in the field indicate that the Bolivian campesinos were slightly
better educated than their Peruvian counterparts (table 13). This increased education has led to a desire for even more. Of the cam pesinos
interviewed 82 perce nt of the Bolivians professed a desire that their
children obtain a priI"l:lary (six years) or secondary (eleven years) level
of education as compared with a similar desire on the part of only 69
percent of the Peruvians. Finally, the Bolivian campesino adults were observed to be more liter ate than their Peruvian neighbors.
SUPPORTING EVIDENCE

Other studies of Peruvian haciendas and Bolivian ex-haciendas in tne
Lake Titicaca region Frovide additional information which confirms most
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of these findings and thus validates the references to the sampled haciendas and ex-haciendas as representative of those in the region. For example,
the Viaeha study of eleven ex-haciendas shows that the sixty sampled
campesinos possessed an average of seven hectares of land and sixty-six
head of livestock (U.A.O.'s) and cultivated approximately one and a
half hectares. 21
Another study found half the campesinos on three Altiplano ex-haciendas with incomes averaging $125 from outside employment!· Likewise,
a sample study of fifty haciendas in the department of Puno, Peru, provides evidence which indicates that the campesinos on these estates
earned npproxillwtcly the same income as the Peruvian campesinos interviewed in the field. According to this report the average campesino had
exclusive use of about six hectares of land, owned between 125 and 220
head of livestock (U.A.O.'s) and shepherded between 300 and 600
U.A.O.'s per family." In short, because they so closely resembled the
Peruvian campesinos interviewed by this writer in terms of resources,
production, and productivity, it is reasonable to expect their incomes to
have been quite similar. In only one respect were the haciendas investigated by this writer different-all four of these haciendas paid their
campesinos the minimum wage, while only half of the fifty haciendas investigated by the Agrarian Reform Office fully complied with the
decree. But in general, there is every reason to expect the incomes of
other campesinos in the region, both Peruvian and Bolivian, to approximate those of the campesinos interviewed by this author. Were it not for
compulsory wage payments, the Peruvian campesinos would have had
much lower incomes and standards of living than the Bolivians. Since
this law has only been in existence since 1964, the Bolivian cnmpesinos
in the region, until very recently, probably had a much higher income than
the Peruvian campesinos.
There is also additional evidence to support the study'S findings that the
Bolivian campesinos were more educated and literate than their Peruvian
counterparts. In the Bolivian sector the Viacha study found 46 percent of
the adult campesinos unable to speak Spanish and 50 percent illiterate.
The study of fifty haciendas in the department of Puno, Peru, found onehalf to have no schools 2. and the remainder to be "deficient." It has been
estimated that 43 percent of the rural children between the ages of five
and fourteen in the department of Puno were enrolled in school during
1963. The same report estimated the rural illiteracy rate for adults in the
department to be 71 percent." Since these estimates are similar to those
arrived at by this author based upon independent samples, they lend
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support to the con ten tion that the Bolivian campesinos on the ex-haciendas in the region were more literate and more educated than the Peruvian
campesinos on the oth er side of the border.

THE EFFECTS OF THE BOLIVIAN LAND REFORM
UPON HUMAN RESOURCES
Once again, the question arises as to what extent these differences in
freedom, mobility, income, and education between the Bolivian campesinos and the PeruviaIl campesinos can be attributed to the Bolivian land
reform of 1953. Did the tenancy conditions of thl' Boliviiln latifnndio
land-tenure system res trict the freedom and mobility of the Indian tenants,
and were these arran~ements largely responsible for their low standards
of living, education, and literacy? And if so, did the Bolivian land reform
make it possible for the Bolivian campesinos to achieve higher incomes,
standards of living, an.d education?
INCOME AND CONSUJVl:PTION BEFORE
AND AFTER THE LAND REFORM

To reiterate, the Peruvian haciendas investigated in many respects
did not resemble the (lrereform Bolivian haciendas. This is most obvio\.ls
with respect to the tenancy arrangements. Below is a list of the rights and
obligations of the Bolivian hacendado and his Indian tenants under the
prereform latifundio land-tenure syste~.

Obligations of the Hacendado
1. To provide each colono with a tract of cultivahle land, called a
sayana, from wh ich he is entitled to aU production and upon which
he can build his own house out of such materials as are at his disposal. This sayana includes the piece of land for his house and a
composite of fre gman ted parcels in various ainokas-tracts of land
devoted to a par ticular crop each year and rotated so that one year
it is planted in potatoes, the next in barley, etc.
2. To allow the co 10no certain rights to pasture his livestock on hacienda land which is not being either used for crops or reserved exclusively for graz:ing the hacendado's livestock.
3. To grant the colono certain rights to irrigation water which is not
being used on the lands exclusively reserved for the hacendado.
4. To furnish the colono with coca and occasionally a noonday meal
during periods of heavy labor such as seeding, harvesting, etc. It
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was often customary to provide the campesino with alcohol for the
festivities that usually followed occasions such as a good harvest.
Obligations of the Colonos
I. To devote three days of each week (usually Monday, Tuesday, and
Wednesday) to the lands or properties of the hacendado. During
the cropping seasons the colo no worked as many days as were
needed to complete the tasks-which often exceeded the customary
three day per week obligation!"
2. To furnish his own tools, oxen, burros, etc., as well as family members to prepare, seed, and harvest the crops of the hacendado and
carry the produce to market or the town house.
3. To assume certain responsibilities for the care of the hacendado's
livestock, land, and buildings.
4. To prepare periodically the products of the hacienda such as tunta
and chuRo ("dehydrated potatoes"), etc.
5. To provide certain personal services to the hacendado and administrator at both the estate and town house. These services included
kitchen duties, collecting fuel, running errands, etc!'
Before the land reform the Bolivian landowners, with few exceptions,
did not pay their laborers and tenants a money wage, but they did demand
agreat deal of the colono's labor-time for their estates. Because the Bolivian campesino had about the same quantity of land and livestock before the land reform as he does today but substantially less labor-time,
he probably produced less on his sayana. In addition, because a great deal
of his labor-time was expended in shepherding the landowner's animals,
working his lands, and providing him with 'personal services, the Indian
tenant was not free to engage in outside employment. Therefore, one can
he reasonably certain that the Bolivian campesinos hcfore thc land reform
did not earn money income outside the estates as they do today.
There can be little doubt that the Bolivian land reform gave the campesinos the freedom, mobility, and time which has enabled them to obtain
greater income. In addition, the Bolivian campesinos not only had higher
per capita incomes in 1964-1965 but also supported approximately 50
percent more people on the same estate lands than they did before 1953.
Because the Bolivian land reform redistributed most of the land previously
used exclusively by the landowners to these new campesinos, it is the
redistribution of labor-time which was the most significant benefit received by the ex-colonos. While it cannot be denied that the higher income
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and standard of living enjoyed by the Bolivian campesinos were achieved
largely at the expense of the expropriated landowners, neither can it be
denied that a part of the increased campesino income was a result of their
increased output on the former estate lands and their outside employment.
This redistribution of income, in turn, created for the first time in Bolivia's history a mass consumption demand in the agrarian sector for
manufactured products which could-be domestically produced. Unlike the
landowners of prerevolutionary days, the campesinos did not consume
imported goods. Unfortunately, n!,!ither did they purchase investment
goods such as fertilizer, tools, etc. Even more regrettable from a developmental point of view was the inability of the domestic manufacturing
sector to provide the clothing, bicycles, transistor radios, etc., which the
campcsinos purchased.
EDUCATION AND LITERACY BEFORE
AND AFTER THE LAND REFORM

The Supreme Decree of August 19,1936, required all Bolivian haciendas
with more than twenty-five colono families to maintain a school for the
education of their children. However, as in Puno, Peru, today, many of
the Bolivian landowners did not comply with the law. For example, the
1946 ministry of agriculture study reported approximately one-fifth of
the sampled haciendas to be without schooling of any type, in violation
of the law. Also, where schools were provided, the facilities were reported
to be "deficient"; only 11 percent of the school-age children were in attendance, the school buildings were "inadequate," the teachers "underpaid," and the quality of teaching "substandard." The study also pointed
out that the Indian tenants themselves were often required to pay the
salaries of the teachers. The end result of this latifundio educational systcm was an illiteracy rate as high as 97 percent Oil SOIlIC of the hacielldas
investigated."" To the Bolivian landowners, the cost of cdUl:ating the Indian
children on their estates was very real and current, whereas the benefits
to them, if any, were intangible and remote. William H. Nicholls recognized this problem when he wrote:
Increasingly, the principle source for financing social overhead, the sociopolitically dominant landlord class will rarely be willing to tax itself in order
to support such public services as education and agricultural extension. 2•
In sum, the latifundio land-tenure system was largely responsible for the
low educational level and high illiteracy rate of the rural population in
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the Bolivian sector of the region before the land reform. Undoubtedly,
such a low level of investment in human resources contributed to the
relatively poor economic performance of these prereform haciendas.
In the Bolivian sector of the L.ake Titicaca region, education has greatly
increased since the land reform of 1953. Because the Bolivian campesino
was no longer required to work for the landowner and because his small
saya.fia never did require all his family's labor and time, he, and especially his children, experienced enforced leisure. In contrast to the landowners' expenses, the cost of education to him was nominal in both
money so and foregone opportunity and the potential benefit great.
William Carter, who also has found education to be permeating the Bolivian ex-haciendas, has given one of the reasons for it:
The new roles of the syndicate leaders, particularly those of the secretary
general and recording secretary, require these officials to be men with both a
speaking and writing knowledge of Spanish. Since schools arc a fairly recent
innovation in the rural areas of the Altiplano and just about the only bilingual
people are those who have attended formal classes, this requirement practically
rules out the elder men as candidates for places of authority. Thus, the very
basis of qualification for leadership has been altered. Youth has replaced age. at
It should be emphasized that this increase in education is in the form
of more education, not a better quality of education. In addition, the Bolivian !and reform may not have been the sole factor responsible for the
postrevolutionary surge in campcsino education and literacy. Apparently,
however, the new land-tenure system is more conducive to the development of human resources than was the former system.
POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF THE BOLIVIAN LAND REFORM
ON THE PERUVIAN SECTOR

Before summarizing, a slight digression is warranted to analyze the
effects of the Bolivian land reform upon the economic performance of the
haciendas and human resources in the Peruvian sector of the Lake Titicaca region. Since the Bolivian land reform undoubtedly influenced the
Peruvian lawmakers in the passage of the 1964 Punonian agrarian reform
and minimum wage decrees, it was also partly responsible for a number
of changes in the Peruvian sector of the Lake Titicaca region. Since 1964
there has occurred an exodus of Peruvian campesinos from the hacienda
to the indigenous communities and towns within the department as well
as to the cities of Arequipa and Lima. In addition, the landowners have
been investing in a better breed of livestock and improved agricultural
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machinery. These changes have given rise to a greater specialization in
ranching and thus to a more extensive use of the land. As a result, labor
productivity has undoubtedly increased. For the hacendado, these changes
have probably contributed to a more efficient use of the labor resource
and a more inefficient use of land. Production for the market undoubtedly
has increased, especially the sale of wool abroad .
From a macroeconomic viewpoint the fOfCI!d migration from the haciendas intensified the population pressure on the minifundios ("small peasant farms") and indigenous communities in the area. This caused an increase in the farming of more marginal and less fertile land than that
which was lying idle on the large haciendas. In addition, this forced
migration to the overcrowded towns and cities increased the numbers of
unemployed and poor urban dwellers.
However, these decrees did reduce the campesino populations on the
haciendas and made wage payments to those rcmail}ing compulsory, all
of which meant a higher income and standard of living for the remaining
Peruvian campesinos. The greatest production cost of the sampled haciendas was wage payments. Prior to the 1964 minimum wage decree,
this cost was virtually nonexistent. This higher income has indirectly
enabled the hacienda campesinos to obtain more freedom, education,
and literacy. Unfortunately, there is no way of determining whether these
changes would have occurred in Peru had there been no land reform in
Bolivia.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The primary purpose of this chapter was to analyze the socioeconomic
effects of the Bolivian land reform upon human resources in the Lake
Titicaca region by means of a comparison of Peruvian haciendas and
Bolivian ex-haciendas. Most striking was the remarkable similarity in the
poor economic performance of those different agricultural units of production operating under dissimilar tenure conditions. Neither the haciendas
nor the ex-haciendas were realizing economies or diseconomies of size
under existing technological and institutional conditions. Indeed, no definitive value-neutral statement could be made about the relative efficiency of either group. With respect to technology, livestock density per
hectare, total production, capital productivity, and production for the
domestic market, the haciendas and ex-haciendas in the region were
virtually indistinguishable.
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The most differen'tiating feature of these land-tenure systems was their
utilization of human resources, On the Bolivian ex-haciendas, the h.igh
population density and incomplete use of campesino labor-time largely
account for their relatively higher land productivity and employment, as
well as their lower labor productivity and agricultural surplus, In spite of
the much lower labor productivity on the ex-haciendas, the Bolivian
campesinos still earned greater per capita incomes during the agricultural
year 1964-1965 and, apparently, enjoyed a ,higher standard of living, In
large part this can be attributed to the lower demand placed on their labor
and time by ex-hacienda production, enabling them to seek outside employment and engage in more marketing activity, Finally, the Bolivian
campesinos were observed to be better educated, more literate, and better
integrated into both the market economy and society than their Peruvian
counterparts,
It was also emphasized in this chapter that the Bolivian haciendas in
the region were, to a significant degree, mere agglomerations of small
Indian sayanas. With the advent of the Bolivian land reform, the Indian
tenants obtained possession of their sayafias, and most of the land previously used exclusively by the landowners was redistributed to new campesinos. Population on the ex-haciendas increased and more marginal
land was put into production, As a result, t?tal production increased, l!!bor
productivity decreased, and capital (livestock) productivity remained virtually unchanged, Total production as well as market production exceeded
prereform levels, largely because of the increased inputs of marginal land
and labor. Because ng size economies were realized by the Bolivian haciendas, none were lost as a consequence of the land reform. Whether any
potential size economies were therefore destroyed by the Bolivian land reform is a purely academic question. The creation of small economic units
of production does not, however, preclude taking advantage of size economies through cooperative efforts, if capital funds and new t~hnology were
made available to the Bolivian campcsinos through state agricultural extension and credit services, Finally, because alternative employment in
Bolivia is limited, the increase in marginal subsistence farming might be
considered an efficient allocation of resources in the short run.
On the one hand, contrary to the expectations of some land-reform
proponents, this analysis indicates that the Bolivian land reform was not a
panacea for the Lake Titicaca region's agricultural and economic problems. On the other hand, contrary to the dire predictions of land-reform
opponents, no evidence was found to indicate that the region's agricultural
and general economic efficiency and progress have grievously suffered as
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a consequence of land reform. These results support those who say that
institutional changes such as the Bolivian land reform have little effect
upon production, productivity, and efficiency in the short run.
However, in the Lake Titicaca region it was man, not land, capital, production, or productivity, who underwent the greatest transformation with
the implementation of the Bolivian land reform . The redistribution of
land and, above all, labor and time made it possible for the Bolivian
campesinos to earn higher per capita incomes from production on the exhaciendas, to increase their marketing activity, and to engage in outside
employment. Their increased income not only raised the campesinos'
standard of living but also created an agrarian demand for manufactured
products capable of domestic production.
The Bolivian land reform was not merely a redistribution of land, labor
and time, or even income; it was simultaneously a redistribution of opportunity, freedom, and power. The campesinos in the region are gradually
becoming more educated, literate, and integrated into the social, political,
and economic life of the nation. Where previously the campesino paid a
labor tax for the land he used, as of 1969 he pays no tax at all and is
the owner of productive private property."2 If private property is truly
the institution which "turns sand into gold," then these new property
owners have as their task what the absentee landowners failed to accomplish. If the existence of a socially, occupationally, and geographically
mobile labor force is conducive to economic efficiency and development,
then the creation of this institution by the Bolivian land reform augurs
well for the attainment of these national goals. Bolivian society is no longer
divided into Indians and Bolivians as before the MNR revolution and
land reform, and the uncertain future of Bolivia will undoubtedly be
greatly influenced by the campesino majority who are now free either to
succeed or to fail on their own merits. The full impact of these changes
will probably not be realized, however, until at least decades, and perhaps
generations, have elapsed.

NOTES
I. Land tenure is the term used for all rights and r.:lationships that have been created among men to govern their affairs with re spect to the land. Land tenancy is the
system under which land is operated and its product divided between the operator
and owner.
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2. Erich H. Jacoby et aI., IlIler·Relatio/l.\hip between Agrariall Reform a",1 Agrim/tural Development, Food and Agricultural Organization of tbe United Nations (Rom.:,
Italy, September 1953), p. 63.
3. Bolivia, Junta Nacional de Planamiento, Plan "aciollal de desarrollo economico
y social, 1962-1971 (La Paz, 1961).
4. Medium properties and agricultural ellterprises were defined as those estates
which use wage labor, modern technology, capital equipment, and produce for the
market.
5. Victor Paz Estenssoro, La revolucion boliviana (La Paz, 1966), p. 19.
6. See map in figure I on p. 306 for the location of the sampled haciendas and exhaciendas.
7. See ONERN y CORPUNO, Program de illventario y evaluacioll de las recursos
naturales del departamento de PUIIO, vol. 5 (Lima, 1965), chap. 7.
8. In accordance with the provisions of the Peruvian Ley de Reform Agraria no.
15037 of November 25, 1964.
9. Because the material in this and the following section of the study has been
published elsewhere, only the salient findings will be summarized in this chapter. For
a more detailed presentation of this economic analysis of the haciendas and ex-baciendas, the reader may consult my "Land Reform and Its Effect Upon Production
and Productivity in the Lake Titicaca Region," Economic Del'e/opmellf arId Cultural
Change (April 1970), pp. 410- 50.
10. This difference in land use was not a consequence of soil fertility, irrigation , or
surface configuration. Neither the haciendas nor the ex-haciendas irrigated more than
a small portion of their pastures. Also, hilly land is often more suitable for cultivation
tban level land since it affords some protection against frosts.
II. On two of the haciendas investigated, the administrators personally managed
the estates only when their organizing abilities were most needed--<luring planting,
harvesting, ~hearing, etc. Indeed, this was not always the case; this writer arrived at
one of the haciendas with the administrator to find the land prepared and the seed
planted, all accomplished without the help of the administrator or the new tractor.
12. See table 14 for a breakdown of these total value outputs by product and producer.
13. See table 15 for a breakdown of this production for the market by product and
producer.
14. Although the Bolivian and the Peruvian campesinos owned approximately half
as many sheep as the Peruvian landowners, they sold almost no wool. According to
the agricultural experts of the Utah Team for AID/ Uoli via, there is a potential market
for this criollo wool and the minimum wool export value to Bolivia is estimated to be
about $12 million a year. Kenneth N. Roberts et aI., Bolivian Wool: A Source 0/
National Wealth, mimeographed (AID, January 1966) .
15. Sol Tax, Penny Capiw/i.Hn (Chicago, III., 1963), p. 12.
16. Theodore W. Schultz, Trtlllofformilig Traditional Agriculture (New Huven,
Conn., 1964), p. 131.
17. Philip M. Raup, "The Contribution of Land Reforms to Agricultural Development: An Analytical Framework" Economic Development and Cultural Change,
3 (October 1963), p. 13.
18. See tables 16 and 17 for this difference in ma rket price.
19. It has been suggested that the Indians chew coca to deaden the pain of the hard
labor they are required to perform. This study seems to confirm this proposition inasmuch as the Peruvian campesinos did work harder than the Bolivians and chewed
more coca.

TABLE 14
VALUE OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCIS SoLD
(In Dollars)

AND

CoNSUMED

Peru
Product

Animal
Sheep
Cattle
Alpaca & Llama
Pigs
Wool
Milk
Cheese
Hides
Subtotal

Crop
Potatoes
Quinua
Cafiahua
Barley
Habas
Dca
Subtotal

Bolivia

Campesinos

Hacendados

Total

Cooperatives

Campesinos

Total

5 5,159
4,198
605
20
200

$ 46,166
14,397
65

5 51,325
18,595
670

$1 ,117
215

:Ii 19,375

20

65,090
9,300
6,485
6,00J

90
475

3,300
2,550

64,890
9,300
3,185
3,450

5 18,258
28,665
3,660
3,185
1,475

525
720

19,965
5,955

20,490
6,675

$16,032

$141,453

$157.485

$3,142

$ 81,163

$ 84.305

S 675

$

3,995
535
75
1,800

S 4,670

$ 960
20

$ 26,490
1,100
1,100
14.265
4.790
15.900

$ 17,450
1,120
1,100
14,390
4,790
15.900

6.405

:Ii 8.130

51 ,105

$ 63.645

$ 64,750

285
340
425

820
415
2,225

125

28,880
3,660
3,275
1,950

S 1,725

$

Total
Plus

SI7,757

S147,858
4.630 •

S165,615
4.630 •

$4,247

$144,808

$149,055

Grand Total

517.757

$152,488

$170,245

$4,247

5144,808

SI49,055

a. 'This fiaure is an imputed value for crop production on forty hectares of hacienda IV based upon the performance of the other haciendas.

TABLE 15
VALUE OF P RODL'crs SOLD
(In Dol/ars)

BY

TIlE PERUVIAN H ACIENDAS AND BOLIVIAN EX-HACIENDAS

Peru
Product
Animal
Sheep
C.attle
Alpaca & Llama
Pigs
Wool
Milk
Cheese
Hides

Subtotal
Crop
Potatoes
Quinua
Caiiahua
Barley
Habas
Oca
Subtotal

Bolivia

Campesinos

Hacendados

Total

Cooperalives

Campesinos

Total

$1.194
4,106
46

$ 40,539

$ 41 ,733
18,455
46

$ 978

$ 7,587

$ 8,565

217

26,861
3,226
2,457

27.078
3,226
2,545
475

145

7.898
185

8.043
185

14,349

64.899 •
9.298
1.097
2,604

1.650
23

64,899
9,298
2,747
2.627

88
475

$7.019

$132.786

$139,805

$1.903

$48,214

$50.117

$-

$

$

S 120

$

S

1.250

$

Total
Plus

$7,019

$134,424
1.180

Grand Total

$7.019

534
61

40

125

45
266
303

303

b

170

266

$ 266

$ 1;068

$ 1,334

$141 ,443
1.180 b

$2,169

$49,282

$51,451

$142,623

$2.169

$49,282

$51.451

$

1.638

$135,604

414

21
388

388

$ -

1,250

1.638

a. Of this figure, $1 ,104 is the value of alpac.a wool sold ; the remainder is the value of sheep's wool.
b. This figure is an imputed value for crops sold by hacienda IV based upon performance of the other haciendas.
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TA8LE 16
AMOUNn AND AVERAOE :FRICES OF PRODUCTS SOLD AND CONSUMED ON FOUR B OLIVIAN

Ex-HACIENDAS
(In Dollars)
Campesino Cooperatives

-- ---

Product
Number

Average
Unit Price·

'- '-' -'- --"- -- ' -Campesinos

- - - - - -- --'_._--",Number b

Average
Unit Price·

Sheep
Rams
Ewes
Lambs

36
186

S 7.25
4.60

2,336
1,692
56

Cattle
Bulls
Cows
Calves

1
2

66.65
75.00

376
76
20

65.40
43 .25
39.35

436
472
3,220

8.40
6.75

Llamas
Pigs
Hides

13
379

Pounds

6.75 d
l.90

Average
Unit Price·

Pounds

S 4.65
4.30
2. 15·

1.85

Average
Unit Price·
--~

Sheep wool
Cheese
Potatoes
Quinua
Caiiahua
Barley
Habas
Oca

1,900
1,050

$ 0.25

16,000
700

0.03
0.03

5,000

0.025

0.50

--

- - - - -- ~

5,896
49,912

$ 0.25 d

883,000
43,960
44,420
713,220
136,780
530,048

0 .03
0.025
0 .025
0.Q2
0 .035
0.03

0.40

-

--

a. All prices are those received in the market for products sold except where indicated.
b. Total amounts sold Clnd consumed are based upon the statistical averages of those
campesinos interviewed.
c. Estimated price based upon the assumption that a lamb, on the average, is worth half
the value of an ewe.
d. Imputed prices base~ upon the market prices received by the campesinos or cooperatives.
20. However, the larger size of the average campesino animal herd might be viewed
as greater savings on their part since livestock is the traditional ca mpesi no bank
account.
21. Estudio ecoll6mico estatiistico del Callton Viacha, mimeographed (l.a Paz,
1965) .
22. Kelso L. Wessel, Social-Ecollomic Comparisoll 0/ Eight Agricultural Communities ill the Oriellte c.lld the Altiplallo, Department of Agricultural Economics of
Cornell University, mimeographed (La Paz, June 1966), p. 75.
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TABLE 17
AMUUNT AND AVEnAlil! PI<ICtS 01' l'ItOlllJCTS SOLO ANIl CONSlJMm ON FOlJlI PERUVIAN
HACIENDAS

(Ill Dol/ars)

Campesinos
Product
Number'
Sheep
Rams
Ewes
Lambs

9
1,825

Cattle
Bulls
Cows
Calves

59
49

Llamas & Alpacas
Pigs
Hides

Potatoes
Quinua
Cailahua
Barley
Milk

27,063
9,504
11,385
17,000 •

b

2.80
1.40'

45.65
30.70

5.10
6.75
1.50 d

119
3
1,700 •

300 •
800 •
6,000

Hacendados

$ 3.75

II

Pounds'
----.. Alpaca wool
Sheep wool
Cheese

Average
Unit Price

Average
Unit Price

--_ ..•

$ 0.26

Number

3,463
4,544
250

$ 6.05

138
116
15

50.60
58.15
44.75

13

2,300

b

Average
Unit Price

Pounds

b

5.40
2.70

5.10 d
1.50
. Average
Unit Price

-_._-- - -

0.15
0.55 d

2,300
155,590 '
5,795

0.025 d
0.03 d
0.03 d
0.025 d

159,846 •
17,850·
2,439 •
72,1 IO.

0.025
0.03
0.03
0.025

116,221 'Its.

0.08

b

$ 0.48

0.41
0.55

a. Total amounts sold and consumed arc based upon the statistical averages of those
campcsinos interviewed.
b. All prices are those received in the market for products sold except where indicated.
c. Estimated price based upon the assumption that a lamb, on Ihe average, is worth half
the value of an ewe.
d. Imputed value based upon the market prices received by the campesinos or hacendados.
e. These ligures (Ire estimates based upon the 11llmher of animals, hectares cultivated,
lind IIverugc yields .
f. An estimated 95,000 of this figure is an imputed amount for hacienda IV based upon
the number of shet:p and average yield .
g. Crop productioll informalion for one haccndado is not included in these figures .
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23. Sample study of haciendas in the department of Puno, Peru.
24. By law, the Peruvian haciendas were ro!quired to muint;lin a primary se h"ol
unly if the numher of school-ugc chil,lren on the eslalc excceded Ihirly .
25. ONERN Y CORPUNO, Program de invelllario y e\'aiuacioll, pp. 25- 26.
26. The righls and obligations varied among colonos within a haciend a. If a colono
was a quarta persona ("fourth of a person"), he was obliged 10 render three labor
days of service per week to the hacendado in return for the use of a small tract of
land. However, if he was a media persolla ("half of a person"), he was required to
provide the landowner with twice as much labor for the use of twice as much land.
Finally, if he was a persona ("full person"), he and his family gave the hacendado
twelve labor days of service each week for the use of four times as much land as a
quarta persona.
27. Estudio socio-econ6mico en las provi"cias de Omasuyos, l" ga";, y L os A fIdes
del departamento de La Paz (La Paz, 1946), pp. 24--26, 85-86.
28. Ibid., pp. 27-28.
29. William H. Nicholls, "An Agricultural Surplus as a Factor in Economic Development," loumai of Political Economy, 71 (February 1963), p. 17.
30. At the time of this study, the Bolivian government paid the sa laries of the rural
schoolteachers and provided technical assistance for the construction of these schools.
In addition, Bolivia had no income or land tax.
3\. William E. Carter, Aymara Communities alld the Boli,-iall A grariall Reform,
University of Florida Monograph 24 (Gainesville, Fla .. Fall 1964) , p. 59.
32. President Barrientos suhmitted a hill to Congress in 19011 10 tax rural lund. As
of the date of this writing, huwever, it haN not been put into law.

